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environmental justice in Bangladesh. It leans on law and social movement theories to explicate
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other civil society organisations. The activists have also sought to introduce emerging international
law principles into the jurisprudence of the courts. These achievements notwithstanding, the paper
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litigation to deploy or encourage more sustainable strategies.
KEYWORDS: Environmental legal activism, law and social movements, right to a decent
environment, PIL, locus standi, Bangladesh
Author Notes: Md. Saiful Karim, Associate Lecturer, School of Law and Justice, Southern
Cross University, Lismore, Australia. He wishes to thank Professor Abdullah-Al-Faroque for
his valuable comments on an earlier draft (saiful24bd@yahoo.com). Dr. Okechukwu Benjamin
Vincents, Barrister and Solicitor, Law Society of Upper Canada. Special thanks to Prof. Chris
Hilson for his useful suggestions on social movements. Mia Mahmudur Rahim, PhD , Macquarie
Law School, Macquarie University.
Brought to you by | Queensland University of Technology
Authenticated | 131.181.251.20
Download Date | 7/26/13 4:10 AM
  
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Public interest litigation (PIL) denotes litigation initiated for the protection of 
public interest. In this type of litigation, the aggrieved party need not be the party 
in the court of law; this type of litigation can be introduced by the court itself or 
by any member of the public. This is an example of legal activism, by which 
society can claim redress for an act that is not directly safeguarded by the 
Constitution and where the State has failed to redress it.1 In A. B. S. K. Songh 
(Railway) v. Union of India,2 the Supreme Court of India provides the cultural 
orientation of PIL in this region. In this case, the court clearly mentions that the 
current jurisprudence of this region3 is not an individualistic Anglo-Indian model; 
it is broad-based and people-oriented. It has toned down the confusion regarding 
the locus standi, as it mentions that “the narrow concept[s] of ‘cause of action’ 
and ‘person aggrieved’ and ‘individual litigation’ are becoming obsolescent”. PIL 
took its form after the seminal judgment of the Supreme Court of India in S. P. 
Gupta v. Union of India.4 
Until 1994, Bangladesh had no reported PIL decided by the Supreme 
Court. The Bangladesh Environmental Lawyers Association (BELA)5 brought an 
environmental issue in the form of a PIL before this court for the first time in this 
country. Dr. Mohiuddin Farooque v. Bangladesh & Others6 was the first case of 
                                                 
1
 Tsun Hang Tey, “Public interest Litigation in Malaysia: Executive Control and Careful 
Negotiation of the Frontiers of Judicial Review” in Po Jen Yap & Holning Lau, eds., Public 
interest Litigation in Asia (London: Routledge, 2010); Vipon Kititasnasorchai & Panat 
Tasneeyanond, “Thai Environmental Law” (2000) 4 S.J.I.C.L. 1; Surya Deva, “Public interest 
Litigation in India: a Quest to Achieve the Impossible?” in Po Jen Yap & Holning Lau, eds., 
Public interest litigation in Asia (London: Routledge, 2010). 
2
 A.I.R. SC. 298,317 (1981). 
3
 The Indo-Pak Sub Continent including Bangladesh and Nepal. 
4
 In this case, the court provides the framework of this type of litigation as follows: “[W]here a 
legal wrong or a legal injury is caused to a person or to a determinate class of persons by reason of 
violation of any constitutional or legal right or any burden is imposed in contravention of any 
constitutional or legal provision or without any authority of law…and such person or determinate 
class of persons is by reason of poverty, helplessness or disability or socially or economically 
disadvantaged position, unable to approach the Court of relief, any member of the public can 
maintain an application for an appropriate direction, order or writ”. For details, see AIR S.C. 149 
(1982) at 188. 
5
 Established in 1992, BELA is the best known Bangladeshi NGO working with the broad 
objective of promoting environmental justice and contributing to the development of sound 
environmental jurisprudence. BELA is a member of IUCN–the World Conservation Union, 
Environmental Law Alliance Worldwide and the South Asian Watch on Trade, Economics and 
Environment. In 2003 it received the Global 500 Role of Honors of the United Nations. For 
details, see online: <http://www.belabangla.org/bela/index.php?option=com_content&view= 
article&id=48:introducing-bela& catid=40:belabangla> (last accessed 17 November 2011). 
6
 Writ Petition No. 891 of 1994. Dr. Mohiuddin Farooque was the founder of BELA. 
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this nature in this country. Thus, the determination of locus standi of the 
petitioner was the vital substantive issue to be settled.7 In this case, the legality of 
an experimental structural project of the huge Flood Action Plan of Bangladesh 
was challenged. The High Court Division of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh8 
initially rejected the petition of this case on the grounds that the petitioner had no 
standing. The petitioner had preferred an appeal to the Appellate Division of the 
Supreme Court of Bangladesh. The Division decided the issues of locus standi in 
PIL. In July 1996, the Appellate Division gave its decision, in which Mustafa 
Kamal, J. observed: 
 
 
In so far as it concerns public wrong or public injury or invasion of 
fundamental rights of an indeterminate number of people, any member of 
the public, being a citizen, suffering the common injury or common 
invasion in common with others or any citizen or an indigenous 
association, as distinguished from a local component of a foreign 
organisation, espousing that particular cause is a person aggrieved and has 
the right to invoke the jurisdiction under Article 102. 
 
Since 1994, BELA, Bangladesh Legal Aid and Services Trust (BLAST), 
Ain o Salish Kendra (ASK), and numerous lawyers have undertaken a large 
number of cases that have contributed to the development of PIL in this country. 
To date, the PILs in this country have been due to various environmental 
problems; amongst these, the relief sought against pollution caused by companies 
is prominent. This is mainly because the environmental regulation framework and 
this country’s governmental agencies are either inefficient, biased, or do not have 
adequate strategies to tackle environmental degradation by business operations. 
In Bangladesh, the human right to a decent environment has been 
established as a fundamental right. The judicial activism that made this possible is 
a direct outcome of the activism of the environmental lawyers. In most of the 
cases, it is those lawyers that initiated the arguments that the courts took up in 
reaching the favourable decisions. The judges themselves have even voiced 
                                                 
7
 Writ Petition No. 998 of 1994. 
8
 The Supreme Court of Bangladesh is the highest court of this country. This court is divided into 
two Divisions: The Appellate Division and the High Court Division. Both these divisions sit in 
Dhaka. The High Court Division has some original jurisdiction and it is the appellate authority of 
the subordinate courts. It decides all writ petitions. Against the decision of this Division, an 
aggrieved person can go to the Appellate Division. The decision of this Division is final. These 
Divisions are safeguarded by the Constitution and they provide clarification of any issues related 
to the constitutional provisions. For details, see Articles 94–113 of the Constitution of the Peoples’ 
Republic of Bangladesh. 
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appreciation of the efforts of the environmental lawyers on more than one 
occasion.9 
However, the successes of this activism via environmental PIL still have 
significant problems beyond the limitations of PIL. This activism in Bangladesh 
often develops “policy evolution fora” for a particular national issue and 
influences executive governance through judicial governance in sectors 
highlighted by groups of public interest litigants. Along with an insufficient 
impact on a substantive change into the social movement, this type of overlapping 
in the major organs of the state illustrates some dissatisfaction with judicial 
process. Government efforts to control environmental legal activist organisations 
under NGO regulations comprise another obstacle for this activism. This hinders 
the entrance of other organisations into the legal activism arena.10 Additionally, 
ongoing limitations in resources are continually a major bottleneck, even for well-
established organisations. For instance, these organisations are in extreme 
shortage of legal and scientific literature on the environment.  
Research and publication from the social movement organisations are 
insufficient. Moreover, there is a dearth of supporting quality research from 
academia. These factors have compelled the environmental lawyers to carryout 
research by themselves. Nevertheless, it is very difficult for the lawyers to 
conduct extensive research in light of time constraints and limited funds. To 
compound matters, each time the environmental lawyers refer to in-house 
research in arguments, their positions carry less weight because the researcher 
himself is a party to the dispute. Sometimes, environmental organisations appear 
helpless in their fight against wealthy and influential parties, since litigation in 
Common Law courts involves a great amount of resources. Threats of death and 
other forms of harm are common against human rights defenders or 
environmental activists of developing countries, and Bangladesh is no 
exception.11   
Moreover, the social change motion set by the judicial activism in this 
country, in most cases, is less than participatory, which has (arguably) led to 
unrealistic solutions. There are some limitations of this activism, with respect to 
                                                 
9
 Dr. Mohiuddin Farooque v. Bangladesh and Others, 55 DLR (HCD) 69 (2003) (hereinafter 
Industrial Pollution Case) at [62]; Dr. Mohiuddin Farooque v. Bangladesh and Others, 50 DLR 
(HCD) 84 (1998) at [83] (hereinafter FAP 20 Judgment on Merit). 
10
 Asian Centre for Human Rights, “Bangladesh's Offer: Become GONGOs or Be Ready for 
Government Takeover”, online: <http://www.achrweb.org/Review/2004/0704.htm> (last accessed 
28 January 2009); Shah A.M.S. Kibria, “Farewell to the NGOs: Their Days in Bangladesh are 
Over?” The Daily Star (6 February 2004). 
11
 Amnesty International, “Bangladesh: Human Rights Defenders Under Attack”, online: 
<http://www. amnesty.org/en/library/asset/ASA13/004/2005/en/dom-ASA130042005en.pdf> (last 
accessed 28 January 2009). 
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access, effectiveness, and sustainability. These shortcomings need to be explored 
and addressed if the true promise of this activism is to be unleashed.  
Given this, the aim of the present paper is to discuss the evolution of 
environmental legal activists in Bangladesh – to highlight the achievements and 
note the challenges. In having this discussion, various analytical approaches may 
be adopted. However, the paper will lean on some law and social movement 
theories to put the Bangladesh environmental movement in perspective and 
explicate the adopted strategies.12 This approach has the added advantage of 
providing some basis for making recommendations useful not only for 
Bangladeshi activists but also for other organisations that are similarly situated. 
The aspect of social movement theories that is the main concern in this paper is 
litigation as a movement strategy – particularly legal mobilisation, which helps 
illuminate the reasons for the choice of litigation as a movement strategy.  
To help locate environmental civil society organisations in Bangladesh 
within the social movement discourse, the remainder of the present section briefly 
discusses social movements generally. However, it also discusses the role of law 
in social movements and highlights the features of legal mobilisation theory of 
major concern in the context of the present study. The second section of the paper 
discusses the achievements of the Bangladesh environmental legal activists, 
particularly regarding the recognition of the right to a decent environment, the 
standing of some civil society organisations, and the progressive development of 
environmental jurisprudence in Bangladesh. The third section proceeds based on 
legal mobilisation and other social movement theories to discuss the choice of 
litigation in Bangladesh and the possible reasons for the successes seen in the 
achievements outlined in the second section. Section four discusses the limits of 
litigation, particularly PIL as a movement strategy. Section five summarises the 
findings of the analysis and offers predictions of future developments, 
opportunities, and challenges for environmental activism in relation to PIL.  
 
A. Social Movements 
 
The aim of this part is not to provide a template for determining whether or not 
the civil society organisations engaged in environmental legal activism in 
Bangladesh qualify as social movement organisations. Instead, it is to map an 
                                                 
12
 Key questions answered by social movement theorists include “why movements originate when 
they do, how they attract and maintain support, how they present issues and formulate strategies 
and tactics, how they structure organizations, how they change cultures, why they generate 
opposition and sometimes decline, and how and why they succeed or fail in their objectives”, S. 
Staggenborg, Social Movements (Don Mills, Ont.: Oxford University Press, 2008) at 2. 
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overview of some of the views adopted by scholars on the meaning of the term.13 
As McCann noted, “considerable disagreement and uncertainty exist regarding 
just how the very concept of ‘social movement’ itself should be defined.”14 
Hence, the overriding considerations here are whether the activities of the 
organisations in focus can be explicated by reference to social movement theories 
and whether reference to such theories can provide useful insight, particularly 
regarding lessons learned from prior studies. 
According to Charles Tilly in Social Movements, a distinctive way of 
pursuing public politics began to take shape in western countries during the late 
18th century, which has since spread and come to be known as social movements. 
Such movements combined three elements: 1) campaigns of collective claims on 
target authorities;15 2) an array of claim-making performances, including special 
purpose associations, public meetings, media statements, and demonstrations 
(social movement repertoire); and 3) public representations of the causes’ 
worthiness, unity, number of members, and commitment.16 In Tilly’s view, social 
movement campaigns involve interactions between at least three parties: “a group 
of self-designated claimants, some object(s) of claims, and a public of some 
kind.”17 He treated the concept as a distinctive form of contentious politics. It is 
contentious because social movements involve collective making of claims that 
would conflict with someone else’s interests if realised. It is also politics, because 
governments of some sort figure somehow in the claim-making as either 
claimants, objects of the claim, allies of the objects, or monitors of the 
contention.18  
In Contentious Politics, Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow added social 
movement bases – the organisations, networks, traditions, and solidarities that 
sustain social movement activities – as a fourth element to the three elements 
mentioned above, and proffered a definition of social movements.19 They defined 
it as “a sustained campaign of claim making, using repeated performances that 
                                                 
13
 There are different definitions of social movements, and some of these do not even consider 
litigation as a social movement tactic/strategy. Given this, this article confined it within the 
established thoughts of social movement and judicial activism, and do not attempt to made any 
comparative study with the different definitions of social movement and judicial activism. 
14
 M. McCann, “How Does Law Matter for Social Movements” in B. Garth & A. Sarat, eds., How 
Does Law Matter (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1998) at 77. 
15
 C. Tilly, Social Movements, 1768-2004 (Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 2004) at 4. For Tilly, 
authorities include government officials, property owners, religious functionaries and other whose 
action or inaction significantly affect the welfare of many people. 
16
 Ibid. at 7. 
17
 Ibid. at 4; “A campaign always links at least three parties: a group of self-designated claimants, 
some object(s) of claims, and a public of some kind…Not the solo actions of claimants, object(s), 
or public, but interactions among the three, constitute a social movement. (emphasis added)”. 
18
 Ibid. at 3. 
19
 C. Tilly & S. Tarrow, Contentious Politics (Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 2007) at 8. 
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advertise the claim, based on organisations, networks, traditions, and solidarities 
that sustain these activities.”20  
This, as is to be expected, is not the only characterisation of “social 
movements”: many other theorists adopt descriptions that do not distinguish as 
strictly as Tilly’s does. Suzanne Staggenborg, for example, identified several 
theorists who argue that movement activity occurs in a wide range of venues and 
through a variety of forms of collective action. Among these, McCarthy and Zald, 
define social movements as “a set of opinions and beliefs in a population which 
represents preferences for changing some elements of the social structure and/or 
reward distribution of a society.”21 While this definition more easily explains 
most civil society organisations that would benefit from social movement 
theories, one of the problems with its non-restrictive general view is that it fails to 
adequately differentiate social movements from minority political parties, interest 
groups, and other forms of collective action for purposes of analysis. This is an 
important point because, to put it in Tilly’s words, expansion of the term to 
include all sorts of popular collective action may “badly handicap any effort to 
describe and explain how social movements actually work”.22 Beyond this 
handicap, Tilly saw little harm in such a broadening of the term in casual political 
discussion.23 
Notwithstanding, many theorists have sought ways to distinguish social 
movements from other forms of collective action. For example, McCann outlined 
four ingredients to delimit social movements and differentiate them from political 
parties and interest groups for the purpose of the introduction to his Law and 
Social Movements. Only three of those are necessary for our purposes here: 1) 
“Social movements aim for a broader scope of social and political transformation 
than do more conventional political activities.”24 This means that, although social 
movements may press for tangible short-term goals, they are inspired by more 
radical visions of a different and better society.25 2) Although social movements 
employ a wide range of tactics (as do parties and interest groups), social 
movements would tend to rely more on communicative strategies of information 
disclosure as well as disruptive tactics such as protests, strikes, and marches that 
halt or upset ongoing practices. These are sometimes combined with conventional 
methods, such as litigation. The emphasis here is on “disruptive”. Litigation here 
                                                 
20
 Ibid. 
21
 See S. Staggenborg, Social Movements, supra note 12 at 6–7. 
22
 C. Tilly, Social Movements, 1768-2004, supra note 15 at 7. 
23
 Ibid. 
24
 M. McCann, “Introduction” in M. McCann, ed., Law and Social Movements (Burlington: 
Ashgate, 2006) at xiv. 
25
 Ibid. 
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serves as a platform for “rebellion” against existing structures of relations.26 3) 
“Social movements tend to develop from core constituencies of non-elites whose 
social positions reflect relatively low degrees of wealth, prestige, or political 
clout.”27 This does not mean that social movements and the elite do not mix, 
because “movements may find leadership or alliance among elites and powerful 
organisations”.28 In sum, theorists like Tilly have favoured a narrowly delimited 
concept of social movement, while others like McCarthy and Zald prefer a less 
restrictive description, and yet others like McCann proffer a way to distinguish 
movements from other forms of collective action when a less restrictive definition 
is utilised.  
McCann went on to discuss legal mobilisation by social reform 
movements.29 In doing so, he addressed Rosenberg’s perspective, which is a much 
stronger critic of judicial activism for social movement.30 While Rosenberg 
questions whether judicial activism can bring about social change at all, McCann 
tempers the doubts by raising his argument that this activism may not do so 
directly, but that the symbolic and strategic values behind this activism can.31 He 
built this argument on Scheingold’s perspective on the politics of rights.32 
McCann explored some theories that are deemed useful for our purposes here. 
Among these, legal mobilisation is one of the theories that explore the 
relationship between law and social movement – a brief discussion of this 
relationship is important to help frame the present paper. 
 
                                                 
26
 Ibid. See also K. J. Fitzgerald & J. Kathleen, “Radical Social Movement Organizations: A 
Theoretical Model” (2000) 41(4) The Sociological Quarterly 573–592. 
27
 Ibid. 
28
 Ibid. 
29
 M. McCann, “Legal Mobilization and Social Reform Movements” in M. McCann, ed., Law and 
Social Movements (Burlington: Ashgate, 2006) at 3–32. 
30
 Regarding Rosengber’s perspective, see G. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring 
About Social Change? (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991) at xii+425; G. Rosenberg, 
“Hollow Hopes and Other Aspirations: A Reply to Feeley and McCann” (1993) 17 Law & Soc. 
Inquiry 761-778; for a critique of Rosenberg’s arguments, see M. Feeley, “Hollow Hopes, 
Flypaper, and Metaphors” 17 Law & Soc. Inquiry 745-760.   
31
 McCann, Rights at Work: Pay Equity Reform and the Politics of Legal Mobilization (Chicago: 
Chicago University Press Ltd, 1994); M. McCann, “Reform Litigation on Trial” (1992) 4 Law & 
Social Movements 715–747.  
32
 Scheingold argues that law surfaces, at least in part, as a “myth of rights.” The myth of rights 
refers to the widespread assumption that 1) “litigation can evoke a declaration of rights from 
courts,” 2) “that it can, further, be used to assure the realization of these rights,” and 3) “that 
realization is tantamount to meaningful change”. In this way, the myth of rights expresses an 
elemental faith in the promises of constitutional government, a “faith in the political efficacy and 
ethical sufficiency of law as a principle of government.” For details, see S. Scheingold, The 
politics of Rights: Lawyers, Public Policy, and Political Change (Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press, 2004). 
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1. Law and Social Movements 
 
In Law and Social Movements, McCann noted that social scientists have paid 
considerable attention to the role of law, litigation, and lawyers in social 
movements, and that consensus on these issues has generally mirrored changes in 
the larger political culture.33 “Most studies in the late 1950s and 1960s, for 
example, provided a generally optimistic view, emphasizing the growing 
accessibility of courts to long-marginalized groups such as racial minorities and 
the poor”.34 Conversely, publications on the topic, prior to 2006, have presented a 
more pessimistic view of the utility of litigation for advancing progressive social 
change in a capitalist society.35 One body of literature, mostly from the Critical 
Legal Studies movement, has critically analysed the ideological biases of 
prevailing public and private law doctrines, which tend to support the status quo 
power relations.36 Another body of literature focused on the institutional 
limitations and trade-offs inherent in social movement litigation. These studies 
point out that the neediest citizens lack the resources to undertake litigation, while 
those who can afford it find out that it is limiting, costly, and can fragment 
movement-building efforts, discourage people from popular mobilisation 
strategies, and lead to an emphasis of judicial victory over genuine social 
change.37 Nevertheless, in his search for a balanced perspective on this issue, 
McCann has been led to reconsider the insights of “legal mobilisation” theory. 
“This approach fully acknowledges that litigation alone rarely advances 
significant social change, but at the same time it recognizes that legal rights 
advocacy can in some circumstances provide a useful resource for social 
movement building and strategic political action.”38  
The legal mobilisation approach urged by McCann sees laws as 
identifiable traditions of symbolic practice. Quoting Marc Galanter,39 McCann 
notes that law should be analysed more as a system of cultural and symbolic 
meanings instead of as a set of operative controls. Law affects people primarily 
through communicative symbols – threats, promises, models, persuasion, 
legitimacy, stigma, etc.40 “Evaluation of how Reform litigation and other 
institutional activities matter thus require accounting for the variable ways that 
                                                 
33
 Ibid. at 3. 
34
 Ibid. 
35
 Ibid. 
36
 Ibid. 
37
 Ibid. at 4. 
38
 Ibid. 
39
 M. Galanter, “Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (and Think 
We Know) about our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society” (1983) 31 UCLAL Rev. 4 at 
127.  
40
 Ibid. 
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differently situated groups interpret and act on those signals sent by officials over 
time.”41 Since the content and relative power of legal meaning vary among 
differently and unequally situated citizens, legal norms, conventions and tactical 
manoeuvers also vary in significance over time. It also follows that discursive 
strategies and institutional ploys become more significant for some types of 
struggles than for others. This leads to a further assumption that “law…can at 
once both empower and disempower variously situated social groups in different 
types of relations.”42 Since law, from this viewpoint, can perpetuate status quo 
power relations (though it can equally provide sources of opposition and change 
within particular institutional terrains), the more important challenge is to 
“determine how and to what degree groups can work within and through these 
legal traditions to advance their causes.”43 In this regard, in a social movement 
approach, there are two levels in which legal power can be relevant to action: 1) 
in shaping the overall “structure of opportunities” available to movements, and 2) 
in the various legal resources available to groups in their struggles.44 As will be 
seen below, it is also especially regarding “opportunities” and “resource 
mobilisation”45 that the kind of legal mobilisation theory advocated by McCann 
has been the most useful in analysing the legal activism by the environmental 
social movement in Bangladesh. 
In this paper, “environmental legal activism” refers to the effort of some 
members of the lawyers’ community to ensure sound environmental and 
ecological order by applying the legal mechanism as a tool. This includes 
undertaking legal action against originators of environmental pollution. The 
conducting of research, awareness creation, and other forms of legal assistance 
and advocacy are also countenanced by the term. Environmental PIL aims to 
                                                 
41
 M. McCann, supra note 14 at 81.  
42
 Ibid. at 82. 
43
 Ibid. 
44
 Ibid. 
45It would be worth describing the nexus amongst “right litigation”, opportunities and resource 
mobilisation. Litigations for rights arose due to two sets of reasons – changes to political 
opportunity and the involvement of certain types of people in the political movement, specially 
lawyers. Political opportunity (including the justice delivery system) structure is a concept under a 
social movement theory known as “political process model”. In this process, resource mobilisation 
is a vital component. In the political process model, resource mobilisation is also called 
“mobilising structures” that refers to the ability of the social actors like human and organisation. 
This is an extended version of the thoughts of resource mobilisation within the political process 
model. In this article, when we refer to “structural opportunity” we usually mean this version of 
resource mobilisation. For details of these types of resource mobilisation, see S. M. Buechlers, 
Social Movement Theory: A Sociology of Knowledge Analysis in Social Movements in Advanced 
Capitalism: The Political Economy and Cultural Construction of Social Activism (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1999); D. Adams, Political Process and the Development of Black 
Insurgency 1930-1970 (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1999). 
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ensure access to justice for all members of the society, particularly members of 
the marginalised segment of the society. Therefore, legal activism comprehends 
the entire range of manoeuvres envisaged by legal mobilisation theories, 
including litigation. Litigation has historically been an important component of 
the repertoire of claim-making strategies available to environmental movements 
around the world. While parts of the present paper establish that litigation has 
been effectively employed in Bangladesh, legal mobilisation theories form the 
primary basis for explicating the choice of litigation by the movement 
organisations and the reasons for the successes. However, other related theories 
that deal with the rise and fall of social movements also help to buttress the 
limitations of litigation and the need to highlight other activist roles such as 
legislative and policy advocacy.   
Nevertheless, legal activism is not to be confused with judicial activism, 
which relates to the activism of judges, although, as will be seen below, the 
receptiveness of the judiciary to novel environmental claims is vital to the 
effectiveness of litigation as a social movement strategy. Furthermore, for the 
purposes of this paper, the view has been adopted that “environmental justice” 
can be achieved through “the fair treatment and meaningful involvement of all 
people regardless of race, colour, national origin, or income with respect to the 
development, implementation, and enforcement of environmental laws, 
regulations, and policies.”46 Perhaps the concept is best understood by drawing 
attention to “environmental injustice”:  
 
Environmental injustice occurs whenever some individual or group bears 
disproportionate environmental risks, like those of hazardous waste 
dumps, or has unequal access to environmental goods, like clean air, or 
has less opportunity to participate in environmental decision-making. In 
every nation of the world poor people and minorities face greater 
environmental risks, have less access to environmental goods, and have 
less ability to control the environmental insults imposed on them.47 
 
Therefore, legal activism for the prevention of environmental injustice is 
another way of describing the focus of this paper. The next step is to show how 
the foregoing theories apply to the movement in Bangladesh. 
                                                 
46
 EPA (USA), “Environmental Justice”, online: <http://www.epa.gov/environmentaljustice/ 
index.html> (last accessed 27 April 2009). 
47
 K. Shrader-Frechette, Environmental Justice: Creating Equality, Reclaiming Democracy 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) at 3. 
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B. The Environmental Social Movement in Bangladesh 
 
The campaigns for environmental protection in Bangladesh, although varied and 
multifaceted, are sufficiently interlinked and sustained to meet most 
characterisations of “social movement”. They have even displayed all of the 
elements in Tilly’s restrictive characterisation of the term: collective claims, 
claim-making performances, and public representations of worthiness etc. The 
strong participants in these campaigns include, but are not limited to, the 
Bangladesh Centre for Advanced Studies (BCAS), the Bangladesh Poribesh 
Andolon (BAPA), and BELA. Since 1986, BCAS has been involved in research 
and publication on environmental issues. It seeks to address sustainable 
development through (a) environment-development integration, (b) good 
governance and people’s participation, (c) poverty alleviation and sustainable 
livelihoods, and (d) economic growth and public-private partnership. It has 
produced a number of publications that have influenced national environmental 
policymaking.48 BCAS’s contribution to environmental conservation is 
recognised within and outside Bangladesh.49 BAPA seeks to build a nationwide 
civic movement aimed at stopping and reversing environmental degradation in 
Bangladesh. It favours social mobilisation, policy advocacy, and conservation, 
and has organised conferences, adopted resolutions, and been involved in 
awareness campaigns through its publications, protests, and other activities.50 
BAPA’s contribution to the environmental movement is also acclaimed by a 
number of authors.51  
However, regarding environmental legal activism in Bangladesh, the 
oldest and most prominent of these organisations is BELA. In Tilly’s 
characterisation, it is the claims for a better environment, which brings these 
organisations together, that constitute the social movement, and not the 
organisations themselves.52 Nevertheless, BELA and others engaged in litigation 
                                                 
48
 See BCEAS, “BCAS website”, online: <http://www.bcas.net/AboutBCAS/About_Index.html> 
(last accessed 17 April 2009).  
49
 UNEP, “Climate Change Links 2008 Champions of the Earth Award Winners”, online: 
<http://www.unep.org/documents.multilingual/default.asp?documentid=525andarticleid=5738andl
=en> (last accessed 25 June 2009). 
50
 See BAPA, “BAPA website”, online: <http://www.bapa.org.bd/Default.aspx > (last accessed 27 
May 2009). 
51
 See D. A. Ahsan et al., “The Relationship of National and International Environmental NGOs in 
Bangladesh and Their Role in Wetland Conservation” (2009) 3 International Journal of 
Environmental Research 23 at 31; and N. Islam, “Broader Significance of the Environmental 
Movement in Bangladesh”, online: <http://www.ben-center.org/BEN/BAPA/ 
nazrulislam.oct20.htm> (last accessed 10 January 2009). 
52
 Tilly, supra note 15 at 6: (“Analysts often confuse a movement’s collective action with the 
organizations and networks that support the action or even consider the organizations and 
networks to constitute the movement…rather than the networks in which they engage”). 
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represent an important component of the campaigns: the litigation facet thereof. 
Whereas Tilly, did not countenance litigation as a social movement performance, 
legal mobilisation theorists like McCann do.  
 
C. Environmental Legal Activism in Bangladesh 
 
The majority of environmental protection achieved through legal activism 
discussed below is related to the activities of BELA. However, after the landmark 
judgment in the FAP-20 case (discussed below) – in which standing was allowed 
for environmental civil society organisations if certain conditions are present – 
some other human rights and legal aid organisations, including, BAPA, 
Bangladesh Legal Aid and Services Trust (BLAST), and Ain o Salish Kendra 
(ASK) began to participate in filing PILs for environmental protection. BLAST, 
ASK, and BELA have worked together to file a number of PILs for environmental 
protection. For example, both BELA and BLAST moved separate writ petitions 
for prevention of Vehicular Pollution in Dhaka City.53 Additionally, BELA 
provides legal assistance to several other environmental organisations in filing 
writ petitions, some cases filed under the name of BELA were made on behalf of 
other environmental civil society organisations.54 Since BELA is the only 
environmental civil society organisation in Bangladesh that has environmental 
legal advocacy as its reason for existence, it is not surprising that it has filed and 
won many more environmental cases than any of the others has.55 This is why its 
activities and processes feature most prominently in the present analysis. 
Nevertheless, the road to the litigation championed by these organisations has 
been rife with obstacles.  
Bangladesh is gifted with an unparalleled natural panorama. The country 
is affluent in terms of natural resources and hardworking people. However, it is 
deficient in terms of sustainable and sound management of these environmental 
                                                 
53
 Dr. Mohiuddin Farooque v. Bangladesh and Others, 55 DLR (HCD) 613 (2003) (hereinafter 
Dhaka City Vehicular Pollution Case). 
54
 Some of these cases are: Nijera Kori v. Bangladesh and others, Writ Petition no. 7248 of 2003 
(Illegal Shrimp Cultivation); Bangladesh Environmental Lawyers Association (BELA) and Global 
Village, Rangamati v. Bangladesh and others, Writ Petition No. 2459 of 2004 (Construction of a 
Community Centre in the Sole Municipal Park of Rangamati town); Bangladesh Environmental 
Lawyers Association (BELA) and Thengamara Mohila Sabuj Sangha (TMSS) v. Bangladesh and 
others, Writ Petition No. 4244/04 (Illegal Sand Extraction from River Korota); Nijera Kori and 
others v. Bangladesh and others, Writ Petition No. 5194 of 2004 (Illegal Shrimp Cultivation and 
Settlement of Land in favour of Landless People). See BELA, “List of Public Interest Litigation”, 
online: <http://www.belabangla.org/html/pil.htm> (last accessed 30 January 2009). 
55
 BELA’s website lists 62 cases it has filed, about 43 of which have had some sort of decision. 
Most of the decided cases had positive outcome: online: <http://www.belabangla.org/ 
html/pil.htm> (last accessed 29 June 2009); none of the other organisations surveyed had anything 
close to these numbers on environmental issues.  
12
Asian Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. 7 [2012], Iss. 1, Art. 13
Brought to you by | Queensland University of Technology
Authenticated | 131.181.251.20
Download Date | 7/26/13 4:10 AM
  
resources.56 Historically, the law and institutions dealing with natural resources in 
Bangladesh were “use” oriented; they are geared towards extracting maximum 
economic benefit. Sometimes, this approach forecloses the interest of future 
generations.57 Like other South Asian common law counterparts, the legal system 
of Bangladesh features an adversarial legal system of “formal procedural justice 
dominated by litigants of equal status engaged in adversarial processes, and 
provides binding, win-lose remedies”.58 One present day result of this system is 
that its adversarial nature is not always attractive, and its time-consuming, 
expensive nature means that the civil courts are not easily accessible to those who 
are most affected by environmental degradation. Additionally, the emerging 
principles of international environmental law have been very slow in finding their 
way into the jurisprudence of Bangladesh’s civil courts.  
Given the foregoing barriers in the legal system, litigation ought not to 
have been a viable option for environmental protection in Bangladesh. 
Nevertheless, some legal practitioners considered it possible to champion 
environmental justice through the courts. Against this backdrop, this paper now 
explores the contribution of legal activism in advancing the course of the overall 
social movement for ensuring environmental justice in Bangladesh. The barriers 
that existed in the legal system help explain why the legal activists did not choose 
well-travelled paths in civil procedure such as the traditional writ of summons, 
instead using writ petitions in procedures that may be described as PIL. In 
Bangladesh, a civil suit starts with the presentation of a plaint (writ of summons) 
by the plaintiff. However, there is no scope for PIL under the Civil Procedure 
Code, although there is scope for class action, representative action, and action in 
public nuisance. Notwithstanding, as will be seen below, Article 102 of the 
Constitution seems to provide such a scope and has been leveraged as such 
through writ petitions.59 However, this does not explain why litigation was 
thought desirable in the first place.  
The paper leans on law and social movement theories to discuss the 
reasons for the PIL being used, the possible reasons for the measure of success 
achieved so far, and the limits of PIL as a social movement strategy. First, 
                                                 
56
 See UNEP and ESCAP, Coastal Environmental Management Plan for Bangladesh Vol. One: 
Summary (Bangkok: UN, 1987). 
57
 M. Farooque, “Regulatory Framework and Some Examples of Environmental Contamination in 
Bangladesh” in BELA, ed., Selected Writings of Mohiuddin Farooque (Dhaka: BELA, 2004) at 
20.  
58
 H. E. Chodosh et al., “Indian Civil Justice System Reform: Limitation and Preservation of the 
Adversarial Process” (1997-1998) 30 New York University Journal of International Law and 
Politics 1 at 1-4.  
59
 For a more detailed outline of the procedural rights in the courts of Bangladesh, see J. Razzaque, 
Public interest environmental litigation in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh (The Hague: Kluwer 
Law International, 2004) at 191–193; 289–292. 
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however, the section below will review some of the achievements of the legal 
activists before discussing the reasons and limits of the litigation strategy to help 
illustrate the broader discussion.  
 
II. THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE LEGAL ACTIVISTS 
 
The present section discusses a number of the cases that established the right to a 
decent environment in Bangladesh, granted standing to civil society organisations, 
and introduced some emerging international law principles into the county’s 
jurisprudence. However, these cases are discussed in a way that highlights the role 
of the activists; the arguments they proffered are highlighted, where possible. 
Although the emphasis here is not on the judicial activism of the judges, there are 
instances where the arguments of the activists stopped and the judges went a little 
further in some of the cases. The section is not meant to be exhaustive. 60  
 
A. Recognition of the Right to a Decent Environment  
 
The recognition of the right to a decent environment as a fundamental right is 
viewed by some as the first important step towards ensuring environmental justice 
for all. The legal activists in Bangladesh share this view and have sought to 
establish this right in Bangladesh. Although there is no specific provision in the 
Constitution of Bangladesh on the fundamental right to a decent environment, 
Articles 31 and 32 of the Constitution do guarantee the right to life. The activists 
broadly interpreted this right to life to include the right to a decent environment. 
In this regard, a series of writ petitions filed by BELA engendered some positive 
development. 
The question of the broader meaning of the right to life was raised for the 
first time in the case of Dr. Mohiuddin Farooque v. Bangladesh and others 
(Radiated Milk Case).61 In that case, part of several consignments of skimmed 
milk imported by Respondent No. 6, Danish Condensed Milk Bangladesh 
Limited, was found, after several tests, to contain radiation levels above the 
minimum approved level of 95 Bq per kilogram. The petitioner, the then 
Secretary General of BELA, submitted to the court in a public interest Writ 
                                                 
60
 For a more elaborate discussion of environmental PIL in Bangladesh, see ibid.; For the literature 
on the PIL in general in Bangladesh, see N. Ahmed, Public Interest Litigation in Bangladesh: 
Constitutional Issues and Remedies (Dhaka: BLAST, 1999); R. Haque, Judicial Activism in 
Bangladesh: A Golden Mean Approach (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 
2011); W. Mesnki, “Public Interest Litigation: Deliverance From all Evils” (2002) 6 Bangladesh 
Journal of Law 1-9; J. Cooper, “Public Interest Law Revisited” (2000) 2 (1) Bangladesh Journal of 
Law 1-25.  
61
 Dr. Mohiuddin Farooque v. Bangladesh and Others, 48 DLR (HCD) 438 (1996) (hereinafter 
Radiated Milk Case). 
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Petition that the consumption of food items containing radiation levels above the 
approved limit is a threat to the life of the people of Bangladesh, including 
himself. He cited Article 18 (1) of the Constitution, which requires the State to 
take measures to raise the level of nutrition and improve public health. He also 
cited Article 21 (2) of the Constitution, which enjoins public officers to strive to 
serve the people and noted that the activities of government officers in dealing 
with the consignment in question have threatened the life of the people. He thus 
contended that the officers in question had violated Articles 31 (right to the 
protection of the law) and 32 (right to life and personal liberty) of the Constitution 
in not compelling the importer to send back the tainted milk.62 Kazi Ebadul 
Hoque, J., agreed with the petitioner and thus agreed to the extended meaning of 
the right to life. Thus, the right to life was construed as including a right to a 
decent environment. This interpretation has had far reaching effects, most notably 
on the question of the locus standi of environmental activists.  
In Dr. Mohiuddin Farooque v. Bangladesh and others (the FAP-20 
Case),63 the relationship between the right to a decent environment and locus 
standi came out clearly. The case was an appeal of the decision of a High Court 
Division of the Supreme Court (hereinafter, High Court Division) summarily 
rejecting a writ petition filed by the then Secretary General of BELA.64 The 
Petition was brought under Article 102 of the Bangladesh Constitution;65 
however, the trial court rejected it on the grounds that the appellant is not “any 
person aggrieved” within the meaning of that provision. On appeal, Dr. Faroque 
argued, inter alia, that those whose fundamental rights are being violated need not 
themselves invoke the jurisdiction under Article 102 (1); others espousing their 
cause may do so provided the persons aggrieved do not object. He noted, “the 
appellant is espousing the cause of violation of Fundamental Rights of a large 
segment of the population in respect of their right to life, property, and 
vocation”.66  
In the lead judgment, Mustafa Kamal, J., agreed. He found that Article 
102 (1) is “a mechanism for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights which can be 
enjoyed by an individual alone insofar as his individual rights are concerned, but 
                                                 
62
 Ibid. at [4]. 
63
 Dr. Mohiuddin Farooque v. Bangladesh and Others, 49 DLR (AD) 1 (1997) (hereinafter FAP 
20 Case). 
64
 From the Judgment and Order dated 18-8-94 passed by the High Court Division in Writ Petition 
No. 998 of 1994. 
65
 The Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh (As Modified up to 17 May 2004), 
Article 102 (1) The High Court Division on the application of any person aggrieved, may give 
such directions or orders to any person or authority, including any person performing any function 
in connection with the affairs of the Republic, as may be appropriate for the enforcement of any 
the fundamental rights conferred by Part III of this Constitution. 
66
 FAP 20 Case, supra note 63 at [25].  
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which can also be shared by an individual in common with others when the rights 
pervade and extend to the entire population and territory.”67 Having noted this 
finding, the next important question, for our purposes, is whether the protection of 
the environment amounts to the protection of a fundamental right. On this, His 
Lordship noted that the petition is concerned with an environmental issue but that 
there is no specific fundamental right in the constitution dealing with the 
environment.68 However, he skirted the question of whether the fundamental right 
to life encompasses the right to a decent environment, choosing instead to rely on 
the averment of the appellant in making the connection between the environment 
and fundamental rights.  
However, in his concurring judgment, B. B. Roy Choudhury, J., did not 
shy away from making a direct connection between environmental protection and 
fundamental rights. This has helped the appellant getting locus standi to maintain 
the writ petition on their behalf. His Lordship noted that the protection and 
preservation of environment, ecological balance, freedom from pollution of air 
and water, and sanitation, without which life can hardly be enjoyed, are within the 
ambit of the constitution of this country.69  
In another writ petition filed by BELA to stop pollution from some 
ultra hazardous industries, A.B.M. Khairul Hoque J. shared the same view. He 
mentions that life means a “qualitative life among others, free from environmental 
hazards.”70 
In that case, BELA brought the action as a “person aggrieved” under 
Article 102 of the Constitution, with the right to life as the fundamental right that 
has been breached.71 It maintained that although the Government by its own 
survey identified factories and industrial units that created ecological imbalance 
due to discharge of various industrial wastes into the air and water bodies, it has 
failed to implement the decision taken in the light of the survey. This, BELA 
contended, violated the Government’s statutory duties. 72 The court agreed.  
In another case, filed in connection with the failure of the government to 
seal tube-wells that were contaminated with arsenic, the Appellate Division of the 
Supreme Court recognised the connection between environmental pollution and 
the violation of the right to life, as well as the need to improve the natural and 
man-made environment with a view to protecting this right. In this case, Md 
                                                 
67
 Ibid. at [44]. 
68
 Ibid. at [55]. 
69
 Ibid. at [102]. 
70
 Industrial Pollution Case, supra note 9 at [53]. 
71
 Ibid. at [13] and [14]. 
72
 Ibid. at [18]. 
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Tafazzul Islam, J., citing the decision of the Indian Supreme Court in the Virender 
Gaur v. State of Haryana,73 observed that: 
 
[H]ygienic environment is an integral facet of right to healthy life, and it 
will be impossible to live with human dignity without a humane and 
healthy environmental protection. Therefore, it has now become a matter 
of grave concern for human existence. Promoting environment protection 
implies maintenance of environment as a whole comprising the man-made 
and natural environment. Therefore, there is a constitutional imperative of 
the State government and the municipalities not only to ensure and 
safeguard proper environment but also an imperative duty to take adequate 
measures to promote, protect, and improve both the man-made and the 
natural environment.74 
 
Therefore, beginning with the radiated milk case, legal activism has 
facilitated the recognition of the human right to a decent environment in 
Bangladesh. The Supreme Court interpreted the fundamental right to life liberally 
to include the right to a decent environment by accepting the views of activist 
lawyers. While the reading of the right to life to include decent environment is 
hardly a novel construction, having been used in India before now, for example, it 
is not an incontrovertible approach. Nonetheless, it may be considered vital to 
environmental protection in a jurisdiction like Bangladesh.  
 
1. The Complexities of Recognising the Right to a Decent Environment by 
Extending the Ambit of Right to Life  
 
Some commentators have highlighted the difficulties inherent in the postulation of 
a substantive right to a decent environment. For example, Boyle highlighted some 
of the objections to this approach. He notes that “definitional problems are 
inherent in any attempt to postulate environmental rights in qualitative terms.”75 
The terms satisfactory, decent, viable, or healthy environment may be incapable 
of substantive definition. The approach by the courts of Bangladesh has not only 
upheld such a right, but did so by reading the right into an existing right.  
Regarding the correct ambit of “right to life”, the overall scheme of 
international human rights law may not be said to have countenanced this 
interpretation. Most of the instruments have separate provisions for 
                                                 
73
 [2] SCC 577 (1995) at [7]. 
74
 Rabia Bhuiyan, MP v Ministry of LGRD and others, 59 DLR (AD) 176 (2007) at [25]. 
75
 A. Boyle, “The Role of International Human Rights Law in the Protection of the Environment” 
in A. Boyle & M. Anderson, eds., Human Rights Approaches to Environmental Protection 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996) at 50. 
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health/standard of living/environment and the right to life.76 For the Covenants, 
the right of everyone to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental 
health through, inter alia, the improvement of all aspects of environmental and 
industrial hygiene is found in the International Covenant on Economic Social and 
Cultural Rights(ICESCR), Article 12 (2) (a).77 The right to life is found in the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Article 6. The 
United Nations negotiations by which these rights are provided for under separate 
instruments have implementation consequences. ICCPR rights are slated for 
immediate implementation, while ICESCR rights are intended to be implemented 
progressively in keeping with available resources.78 Both Covenants were adopted 
at the same time, and different rights were assigned to each according to how the 
member States agreed they were to be implemented. Furthermore, in interpreting 
the right to life in Article 6 of the ICCPR, the Human Rights Committee (HRC) 
did not countenance environmental protection, speaking instead of killings, 
deprivation of life, and wars.79  
Nevertheless, it would be quite difficult to argue that the judicial decisions 
requiring the sealing of tube wells contaminated with arsenic and preventing the 
distribution of milk tainted with unacceptable levels of radiation, as seen in the 
above cases, does not protect the right to life. However, when it comes to the 
discharge of various industrial wastes into the air and water bodies, as also seen in 
one of the above cases, it becomes questionable as to whether the right to be 
protected from such pollution quite reaches the threshold of a non-derogable right. 
According to the HRC, the right to life is “the supreme right from which no 
derogation is permitted even in times of public emergency.”80 This is more so 
given that there may be real technical and/or financial constraints to the 
enforcement of adequate pollution standards. In short, the reinterpretation of the 
right to life to include the right to a decent environment will not always be a 
perfect fit; it would sometimes lead to open-ended obligations that would 
inordinately stretch state resources, particularly in a developing country like 
Bangladesh. However, for the purposes of the present paper, it must be 
ascertained whether it was necessary to couch the claim for a decent environment 
                                                 
76
 See e.g., UN General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 
1948, 217 A (III): provides for the right to life under Article 3 and the right to a standard of living 
adequate for health and wellbeing in Article 25.  
77
 International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights, 1966 (ICESCR), 16 December 
1966, 993 UNTS 3 (entered into force 3 January 1976), Art. 12. 
78
 See Arts. 2 ICCPR, 1966 and ICESCR, 1966. 
79
 CCPR, CCPR General Comment No. 6 The Right to Life, 30 April 1982, online: 
<http://www.unhchr. ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/84ab9690ccd81fc7c12563ed0046fae3> (last accessed 28 
April 2009). 
80
 Ibid., para. 1. 
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in the language of rights and, if so, whether the right to life was the only viable 
option.   
Bangladesh is a party to most of the major international environmental 
conventions.81 However, the country is very slow in enacting domestic laws to 
implement the treaties. Accordingly, the presence of a social movement for 
environmental justice is not surprising. It is equally unsurprising that the activists 
chose to frame their claims in the language of rights, because traditionally, the 
language of rights have proved effective in rallying people to social movement 
causes around the world. According to McCann, an acknowledged manifestation 
of legal mobilisation in reform politics is its contribution to movement building. 
This building process is made up of two related aspects: the development of an 
agenda of rights-based claims, and mass constituent activation and organisation 
based on the rights claims.82 Citing Elizabeth Schneider, McCann noted that 
agenda building around particular rights claims can emerge in a number of ways, 
including by exploiting the conflict between settled rights claims and practices 
that violate those rights, by exploiting contradictions within discursive logics of 
rights, or by developing logical extensions or new applications of already settled 
rights claims.83  
The extent of the contribution of the establishment of the right to a decent 
environment to the building of the environmental movement in Bangladesh, and 
some of the conditions that would have informed litigation as a movement 
strategy are explored below. However, at this juncture, it suffices to posit that the 
activists actually developed their rights-based claim by insisting on a logical 
extension to the right to life. Given the difficulties associated with a substantive 
right to a decent environment and the shortcoming of retrofitting the right to life 
to accommodate environmental claims, did the activists have options other than 
extending the meaning of the right to life? As will be seen below, the standing of 
the activists to bring environmental claims on behalf of people who are unable to 
represent themselves was contingent on there having been a breach of a 
fundamental right. Part III of the Constitution of Bangladesh does not contain any 
environmental rights; thus, the right to life would seem to be the only option with 
a chance of success, particularly in light of the successful extension of its ambit to 
include environmental claims in India.84 Therefore, it would seem that the 
                                                 
81
 Department of Environment, List of Environment Related International Conventions, Protocols, 
Treaties Signed/Ratified by Bangladesh, online: <http://www.doe-bd.org/agreement.html> (last 
accessed 28 April 2009). 
82
 M. McCann, supra note 29 at 10. 
83
 Ibid. at 10–11. 
84
 See generally; Damodhar Rao v. Municipal Corporation, Hyderabad (AIR 1987 AP 170); L. K. 
Koolwal v. State of Rajasthan (AIR 1988 Raj 2); V. Lakshmipathy v. State of Karnataka (AIR 
1992 Kant 57); Chetriya Pardushan Mukti Sangarsh Samiti v. State of UP (AIR 1990 SC 2060); 
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activists had few options if they were to pursue a litigation strategy. Whether or 
not the status quo should be maintained in this regard is a different question 
altogether. Without doubt, it would be more desirable for any jurisdiction to 
develop laws, policies, and an enforcement climate that upheld wholesome 
environmental protection beyond court-mediated settlements. In light of this, 
litigation as a movement strategy will also be explored below.85 First, however, 
the following subsection will discuss how the activists achieved locus standi and 
sought to incorporate emerging international environmental principles into the 
jurisprudence of Bangladeshi courts.     
 
B. Locus Standi 
 
As is the case in many other jurisdictions, one of the initial problems encountered 
by the environmental legal activists was that of locus standi. The surmounting of 
this problem represents one of the strongest contributions of the environmental 
legal activists to the cause of environmental justice in Bangladesh.  
In the FAP-20 Case86 discussed above, the Appellate Division of the 
Supreme Court paved the way for locus standi for environmental activists and 
other civil society organisations. It interpreted the constitutional term, “person 
aggrieved”, to allow BELA, represented by Dr. Mohiuddin Farooque, to file a 
writ petition under Article 102 of the Constitution on behalf of the people affected 
by a government flood mitigation pilot project. The project is known as the 
Compartmentalisation Pilot Project (CPP) under the Flood Action Plan (FAP) 
Number 20. As noted above, the High Court Division summarily rejected BELA’s 
Writ Petition as it was of the opinion that neither Dr. Farooque nor BELA was 
directly affected by the project and, consequently, did not constitute a “person 
aggrieved”, under Article 102 of the Constitution. The restrictive interpretation of 
this constitutional provision by the High Court Division was overturned on appeal 
by the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, granting standing to Dr. 
Farooque. On this issue, Mostafa Kamal, J., held that: 
 
[I]nterpreting the word ‘any person aggrieved’ meaning only and 
exclusively individuals and excluding the consideration of people as a 
collective and consolidated personality will be a stand taken against the 
Constitution.87  
                                                                                                                                     
Subhash Kumar v. State of Bihar (AIR 1991 SC 420); Virendra Gaur v. State of Haryana 2 SCC 
577 (1995). 
85
 According to McCann, “Legally constituted ways of doing carry with them their own 
limitations, biases, and burdensome baggage.” McCann, supra note 29 at 6. 
86
 FAP 20 Case, supra note 63. 
87
 FAP 20 Case, supra note 63at [47]. 
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B.B. Roy Choudhury, J., went further, and held that:  
 
The expression ‘person aggrieved’ means not only any person who is 
personally aggrieved but also one whose heart bleeds for his less fortunate 
fellow beings for a wrong done by the Government or a local authority in 
not fulfilling its constitutional or statuary obligations.88  
 
BELA’s achievement in moving the courts to grant standing to an 
environmental civil society organisation for the first time is particularly 
significant considering the history of standing in Bangladeshi courts prior to the 
decision.   
Perhaps the first case in which the question of locus standi was addressed 
in Bangladesh is Kazi Moklesur Rahman v. Bangladesh and another.89 In that 
case, the petitioner challenged the Delhi Treaty on the grounds that its terms 
involved the cession of part of the territory of Bangladesh. Although the writ 
petition was summarily dismissed by both the High Court Division and the 
Supreme Court on appeal, the Supreme Court observed that the appellant had the 
competency to claim a hearing.90 The Supreme Court found that the fact that the 
appellant was not a resident of the region of Bangladesh affected by the treaty did 
not preclude his competency to bring the claim. This competency is based on the 
threat to the appellant’s fundamental freedom of movement in the entire territory 
of Bangladesh. The court referred to this as a constitutional issue of grave 
importance.91 
This liberal view notwithstanding, this case gives no authority for standing 
for a person whose own fundamental right has not been infringed, such as an 
environmental civil society organisation not claiming redress on its own behalf. 
Moreover, some other locus standi cases involving associations of persons that 
came after this case did not meet with success. In Bangladesh Sangbad Patra 
Parishad,92 it was found that the petitioner could not maintain the petition in a 
representative capacity. This ruling was cited with approval in Dada Match 
Workers Union,93 where it was held that a trade union cannot maintain an 
application under Article 102 of the Constitution asking relief for its members. 
The court observed that the petitioner was not espousing the cause of a 
downtrodden and deprived section of the society that cannot afford to enforce its 
fundamental rights.  
                                                 
88
 Ibid. at [97]. 
89
 26 DLR (SC) 44 (1974). 
90
 Ibid. at [17] and [18]. 
91
 Ibid. at [18]. 
92
 Bangladesh Sangbadpatra Parishad (BSP) v Bangladesh 43 DLR (AD) 126 (1991) at [12]. 
93
 Dada Match Workers Union v Bangladesh 29 DLR (HCD) 188 (1977). 
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Nevertheless, in Retired Government Employees,94 the High Court 
Division held that the petitioner was a “person aggrieved” within the meaning of 
Article 102 (1) and (2) of the Constitution. It found that the association had an 
interest in ventilating the common grievances of all its members. Again, this 
ruling is no authority for standing for a person whose own fundamental right has 
not been infringed. However, in the FAP 20 Case, just such a petitioner was 
granted standing, not least because BELA declined to let the extant legal position 
deter it from pursuing environmental justice. The fact that BELA was 
championing the cause of the downtrodden and the seriousness of the 
fundamental right to life, which encompasses the right to a decent environment, 
informed the court’s decision in that case. The judgment not only opened the door 
to writ petitions for safeguarding environmental rights, but also for ensuring all 
other fundamental rights.   
 
C. Progressive Development of Environmental Jurisprudence 
 
Law informs societal actions and cultures such that judicial pronouncements seem 
to be one way to introduce internationally recognised environmental principles 
into the national discourse in a jurisdiction where official endorsement and 
application is slow. A survey of decided cases in Bangladesh reveals that the 
activists shared this view, because one of the consequences of the sort of legal 
activism discussed in the foregoing paragraphs is the development of the 
environmental jurisprudence of Bangladesh, including, in particular, the 
recognition of emerging international environmental laws and norms in the 
domestic arena. The international environmental law norms that the activists have 
sought to implement in Bangladesh include Intergenerational Equity, the Polluter 
Pays Principle, and the Precautionary Principle.95 These they sought to highlight 
through PIL as well as legislative advocacy; however, the response from the 
judiciary has been mixed at best. The Bangladesh Supreme Court mentioned 
intergenerational equity on some occasions but has generally not been supportive 
of the principle, though there are signs that this attitude is changing. However, the 
High Court Division adopted a slightly different view in a recently decided case 
filed by BAPA. In Bangladesh Paribesh Andolon and another v Bangladesh and 
others, Imman Ali, J., observed that the “right to have open space, parks, 
waterbodies, etc. are rights accruing to Nature and the Environment, which it is 
                                                 
94
 Bangladesh Retired Government Employees Welfare Association v Bangladesh 46 DLR (HCD) 
426 (1994) at [21]. 
95
 On implementation of these international environmental law principles in Bangladesh, see 
generally, Razzaque, Public interest environmental litigation in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, 
supra note 59, at 333–73. 
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the bounden duty of the State to preserve for the sake of future generations. 
[emphasis added]”96  
This case equally heralded a new direction for environmental 
jurisprudence in Bangladesh. A group of environmental activists challenged the 
legality of construction of residences for the Speaker and Deputy Speaker within 
the National Assembly Area through alteration of the original plan of the National 
Assembly Complex. The complex is recognised as a masterpiece: the work of a 
globally renowned architect, Louis Isadore Kahn, which is regarded as one of the 
best monuments of International Architectural Modernism. The court prohibited 
any kind of change in the original plan of the complex.97 It directed the 
government to consider declaring the complex a National Heritage Site and to 
apply to UNESCO to declare it a World Heritage Site in order to protect it from 
further defacement.98 This judgement could result in the application of the terms 
of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage Convention99 in Bangladesh, and 
perhaps pave the way for its implementation in the country. 
The Supreme Court also indirectly recognised the “Precautionary 
Principle” when it recognised the rights of potential consumers in the Radiated 
Milk Case.100 Additionally, in one of the more recent cases filed by BELA, the 
Supreme Court directed government authorities to make necessary rules and 
regulations so that no hazardous ships can enter the territorial waters of 
Bangladesh for breaking purposes. It reasoned that the breaking of ships with 
hazardous substances may cause significant harm to the coastal and marine 
environment of the country.101 This, indeed, is a tacit precautionary approach to 
environmental protection.   
Furthermore, in one of the writ petition cases now pending for further 
hearing in the High Court Division, government authorities were directed to 
undertake investigation to identify and measure the areas within a pristine island, 
Sonadia, where shrimp cultivation/forest clearing is taking place or has taken 
place. The government is also to list those who are involved in such 
cultivation/clearing and the enabling arrangements; assess, in monetary terms, the 
loss of forest resources for such individual shrimp cultivation/forest clearing; and 
                                                 
96
 Bangladesh Paribesh Andolon and another v Bangladesh and others 58 DLR (HCD) 441 (2006) 
at [28]. 
97
 Ibid. at [29]. 
98
 Ibid. at [34]. 
99
 Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, 1972, 23 
November 1972, 1037 UNTS 151 (entered into force 15 December 1975). 
100
 Radiated Milk Case, supra note 61. See Razzaque, Public interest environmental litigation in 
India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, supra note 59, at 357–58. 
101
 Bangladesh Environmental Lawyers Association (BELA) v. Bangladesh and others, Writ 
Petition No. 3916 of 2006, judgment delivered on 6 July 2006, unreported (hereinafter MT 
Alfaship Case) at 4. 
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submit a report to the court within two months.102 The activists’ hope is that the 
court will apply the polluter pays principle. In yet another Writ Petition, also 
related to commercial shrimp cultivation, the High Court Division issued a Rule 
Nisi, calling upon the respondents to show cause as to why they should not be 
directed to compensate the affected people for the loss suffered by them due to the 
flow of saline water over their lands.103 The activists also hope that the Supreme 
Court would consider these pending cases from a different viewpoint by 
positively responding to their arguments and, thereby, play an instrumental role in 
implementing emerging international environmental law norms in Bangladesh. 
While intergenerational equity, the precautionary principle, and the polluter pays 
principle may not be said to have become firmly established legal norms in 
Bangladesh, these dicta represent important strides in the right direction.   
 
III. WHY LITIGATION 
 
This part of the paper considers not only why litigation was considered viable in 
Bangladesh but also why it was successful. The theories considered apply by 
implication to other countries that bear certain similarities to Bangladesh. Some 
legal mobilisation theorists take the view that it is the direct effect (i.e., the short-
term remedial reliefs) of formal legal action that motivates the choice of litigation 
as a strategy.104 However, McCann urges an approach to legal mobilisation that 
also considers the indirect effects of official legal action on social struggles. 
These may include “catalysing movement building efforts, generating public 
support for new rights claims, or providing pressure to supplement other political 
tactics.”105 In addition to the agenda development already discussed above 
(section II(A)(1)), forms of constituent activation discussed by McCann include 
publicity, rights consciousness, and political identity.106  
In Bangladesh, some of the cases discussed above attracted 
extensive media attention, most of which was positive. Therefore, it is not 
surprising that environmental questions have gained increased prominence in the 
national discourse. While it is difficult to measure the overall effect of the cases 
on mass constituent activation and the growth of the environmental movements, 
signs of these are available. BELA, for one, has grown from a few activists to a 
staff of nearly 60 people in six different offices around the country. The publicity 
                                                 
102
 Bangladesh Environmental Lawyers Association (BELA) v. Ministry of Land and others, Writ 
Petition no. 4286 of 2003. 
103
 Gaurang Proshad Roy and Bangladesh Environmental Lawyers Association (BELA) v. 
Bangladesh and others, Writ Petition No. 5732 of 2005. 
104
 M. McCann, supra note 29 at 8. 
105
 Ibid.  
106
 Ibid. at 11–15. 
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spawned by the successful cases and the various awards bestowed on BELA and 
its leaders107 have arguably added a layer of legitimacy to the environmental 
cause. The high success rate of the litigations also adds some persuasiveness or 
pressure to supplement other political tactics. Thus, legal activism yields not only 
direct results in terms of court ordered reliefs, but also indirect effects that support 
other movement strategies. Given the networking amongst the social movement 
organisation in Bangladesh, it is believed that these effects are felt to varying 
degrees in other organisations that are not directly involved in litigation.    
The foregoing throws some light on the advantages of litigation as a social 
movement strategy; however, it fails to fully answer the questions of why the 
activists considered litigation an option in the first place and why it has had the 
measure of success explained above. Some social movement scholars have 
developed theories that help outline the conditions that inform the choice of 
litigation from a social movement’s repertoire of actions. McCann outlined two of 
these theories: resource mobilisation and structural opportunities.108   
 
A. Resource Mobilisation 
 
According to McCann, scholars have a wide range of approaches to resource 
mobilisation, but they tend to elevate two types of concerns. “One is the focus on 
a pre-existing core of activist leaders who serve as the primary ‘agents of rights 
mobilisation’”.109 Here, an existing core of activists may use litigation to mobilise 
a mass constituency. A second category of resources “includes various pre-
existing organisational ties among mobilizable constituencies.”110 Here, the theory 
is that organisations that are able to network with others on whom they can 
depend for resources such as personnel and money are more likely than 
previously unaffiliated persons to succeed in rights-oriented actions. The 
professional and educational backgrounds of social movement organisation 
participants form part of the resources available to an organisation, according to 
Hilson. Of interest to present purposes, he notes, “litigation is also only likely to 
be adopted as a strategy where an individual within an SMO [Social Movement 
Organisation] or its network has direct experience of the law.”111 
These theories are certainly borne out by the legal mobilisation story of 
Bangladesh. BELA was established in 1992 with Dr. Mohiuddin Farooque (1954–
                                                 
107
 In 2003, BELA became a laureate of the UNEP Global 500 Role of Honour, See UNEP, Adult 
Award Winner in 2003, online: <http://www.global500.org/ViewLaureate.asp?ID=724> (last 
accessed 9 May 2009. 
108
 McCann, supra note 29 at 18. 
109
 Ibid. 
110
 Ibid. 
111
 C. Hilson, “New Social Movements: the Role of Legal Opportunity” (2002) 9 Journal of 
European Public Policy 238 at 240–241. 
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1997) as its founder and executive director and a group of young lawyers as 
founding members. The first petition by a national NGO with environmental 
protection consequences was filed by BELA in 1994.112 From the very beginning, 
BELA has been a member of the Coalition of Environmental NGOs (CEN) in 
Bangladesh.113 CEN is a loose coalition of environmental NGOs involving both 
lawyer- and non-lawyer-led NGOs. While CEN may not be said to be very active, 
it is likely that just the sense of belonging to such an umbrella organisation would, 
at the very least, act as moral support for emerging organisations. It is also likely 
that, at inception, BELA had encouragement and ideas from fellow members. In 
any case, it is clear that BELA was funded by pre-existing organisations. The 
Asia Foundation, for example, intimates that it had a meeting with Dr. Farooque 
in the spring of 1993 in which the details of its first grant to BELA was shaped.114 
This was before BELA filed its first petition.115 In sum, the availability of 
resources is part of the reason that litigation was chosen in Bangladesh, and it 
played no small role in its relative success.  
 
B. Structural Opportunity 
 
In McCann’s view, structural opportunities pertain to changes in social relations 
experienced over time by particular groups of citizens. These could be changes 
related to economic depression, work roles, or new forms of state control that 
bring new forms of hardship and oppression. Such changes may also unsettle 
expectations and open new vistas of perceived opportunity or sense of 
entitlement. One shortcoming in this view is that it relies heavily on some of the 
“classical theories of the 1960s and early 1970s [which] emphasized the role of 
discontent or grievances in explaining the emergence of social movements”.116 
Some theorists have deemphasised this view. McCarthy and Zald, for example, 
pointed to some empirical work that casts doubt on the assumption of a close link 
                                                 
112
 Dr. Mohiuddin Farooque v. Election Commission and others, Writ Petition No. 186/1994 
(Nuisance during Election Campaign) 
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 Hilson, “New Social Movements: the Role of Legal Opportunity”, supra note 111, at 240. 
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between preexisting discontent and generalised beliefs in the rise of social 
movement phenomena.117  
Without doubt, legal mobilisation could be precipitated by previously 
unexploited opportunity that has always been there. In this regard, a more general 
theory of political opportunity is more suitable to analysing the choice of 
litigation in Bangladesh. The approach taken by Chris Hilson in discussing 
“political opportunity” is particularly helpful for our purposes. Hilson drew 
attention to the structural and contingent components of opportunity. Structural 
opportunity refers to the structural openness or “closedness” of a political system, 
while contingent opportunity refers to the contingent receptiveness of political 
elites to collective action.118 In this respect, attention must be paid to not only the 
openness in terms of access to the administration but also to the political 
receptivity to the claims being made. Hilson further noted that “litigation or 
protest may arise from lack of success in conventional political arena[s]”; access, 
though necessary, is not sufficient for success, as political elites must also be 
receptive to the claims being made and be willing to change policy accordingly.119 
In the Bangladesh experience, BELA cites environmental degradation through 
“faulty policy priorities and approaches and of course poor governance that also 
accounts for non-implementation of environmental laws”120 as the backdrop for 
its emergence as a legal advocacy group. As noted above, some environmental 
protection NGOs, such as BCAS, preceded BELA; nevertheless, BELA still 
claimed faulty policy priorities and approaches at its inception. This indicates a 
measure of lack of success of the environmental movement in the conventional 
political arena.  
Furthermore, Hilson demonstrated a distinction between the broader 
political opportunity and the narrower legal opportunity, which theorists are wont 
to subsume under political opportunity. Legal opportunity relates to opportunities 
in court-based litigation strategy. The structural side of legal opportunity refers to 
the more stable features of a system, such as access to justice and standing, while 
the key contingent feature is judicial receptivity to policy arguments.121 
Contingent legal opportunity perhaps accounts for the actual courtroom successes 
of the legal activists in Bangladesh, as seen in the cases discussed above. It 
touches on the judicial activism of the Bangladeshi bench and the receptiveness of 
the judges to the claims of the activists. This helps account for not only the initial 
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choice and success of the litigation strategy, but also for its continued 
employment in the movement.  
Judicial activism is one of those terms that defy easy definition, and this 
paper is not well positioned to explore the concept in any extensive manner. 
However, placing reliance on parts of the multidimensional model proffered by 
Cohen and Kremnitzer, it is not difficult to see that the major decisions that the 
Bangladesh legal activists would consider successful involved some judicial 
activism. Cohen and Kremnitzer had three visions of judicial activism, one of 
which hinges on the traditional vision of the judiciary. Although this vision does 
not fully address the various ways in which courts can impact upon society, it 
suffices for the purposes of the present paper. Under this approach, “activist 
courts are activist when they change the law, overstep their role of dispute 
resolution, and decide on policy and other broad social questions.”122  
Cohen and Kremnitzer discussed twelve parameters against which 
particular decisions may be measured to determine the level of activism of a 
court. Some of these indicate a measure of activism in the cases discussed above. 
For example, the second of the parameters concerns interpretation and holds that a 
court that interprets a legal text in possible contradiction with assumed original 
intent or its linguistic meaning is more activist than one that sticks to the original 
meaning.123As noted above, the meaning the courts assigned to the “right to life” 
is not one that is countenanced in the scheme of international human rights law. It 
is also unlikely that the framers of the Constitution had that meaning in mind. 
According to the fifth parameter, courts that are ready to jump threshold hurdles 
such as standing are generally more activist.124 This, again, is exactly the line the 
courts chose to tow in response to the arguments of the legal activists on standing 
for environmental civil society organisations in Bangladesh. Finally, according to 
the ninth parameter, a court that extensively relies on foreign arrangements that 
are not binding in the domestic sphere would be more activists than one that does 
not. On the face of the cases discussed above the courts overtly relied on the 
outcome in the Indian courts only in a few of the cases. However, there is no 
gainsaying the fact that Indian jurisprudence influenced the receptiveness of the 
Bangladeshi judges to the environmental claims of the activists on the right to life 
and standing, not least because of the similarity in the outcomes. All these amount 
to ripe legal opportunity; an activist judiciary that is amenable to particular rights 
claims is always a legal opportunity for any social movement that champions such 
claims. This explains the continued use of litigation by the environmental social 
movement in Bangladesh.  
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The foregoing notwithstanding, the use of litigation as a social movement 
strategy has limitations, and it is to these we turn in the following section.  
 
IV. THE LIMITS OF LITIGATION AS A MOVEMENT STRATEGY 
 
A. To PIL or Not to PIL 
 
So far, the paper has discussed the use of PIL as a social movement strategy in 
Bangladesh and considered the reason for the choice of litigation and why it has 
been successful. However, the choice of litigation as a movement strategy does 
seem to bring limitations. As noted above, McCann acknowledged that “litigation 
alone rarely advances significant social change.”125 However, he also recognised 
that legal rights advocacy can, in some circumstances, provide a useful resource 
for social movement building, as has been demonstrated above. Regarding the use 
of litigation in environmental activism, some commentators have highlighted the 
shortcomings of PIL in particular, especially in India.126 According to Rajamani, 
“[a]lthough the Court has done and continues to do exemplary work, the exercise 
of public interest environmental jurisdiction raises concerns with respect to 
access, participation, effectiveness and sustainability, concerns which need to be 
explored and addressed if the true promise of public interest jurisdiction is to be 
unleashed.”127 In their article, The Delhi Pollution Case: the Supreme Court of 
India and the Limits of Judicial Power, Armin Rosencranz and Michael Jackson 
noted that The Supreme Court ruling to mandate the conversion of the Delhi bus 
fleet to CNG in M.C. Mehta v Union of India128 was a well-informed and logical 
decision. Notwithstanding, they pointed to some disadvantages of the strong 
stance taken by the court in that case, and concluded that “the Court's action 
[mandating the conversion of the Delhi bus fleet to CNG] seems likely to impede 
capacity building in the pollution control agencies, and thereby to compromise the 
development of sustained environmental management in India.”129  
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According to G.L. Peiris, “PIL represents a daring, and in some respects 
unique, response to a problem of unparalleled proportions. The character and 
degree of the challenge are related to societal conditions in the subcontinent, 
which pose the danger of significant alienation of a large section of the 
community from the values infusing the legal system.” However, the vigour and 
novelty of this judicial initiative have led to intractable dilemmas regarding the 
relationship between the judiciary and other organs of government. At the centre 
of the problem is the political accountability of the courts and, perhaps, the 
practicality of their leadership roles in the formulation and implementation of 
broad social policy.130 In the body of this piece, Peiris referred to several 
heterodox features of PIL, including the tendency of the courts to get embroiled in 
the most controversial and divisive of policy issues;131 detailed administrative 
adjudication; and fact-finding mechanisms including the appointment of 
committees of experts bestowed with extensive powers of discovery.132 
Some of these concerns are quite instructive and are briefly considered 
below regarding Bangladesh. A full consideration of the concerns is not possible 
in the present paper, so only brief comments are offered. Nevertheless, it should 
be noted from the outset that the paper considers that although a considerable 
amount of flexibility attaches to PIL in most developing-country jurisdictions, 
PIL as a procedure of litigation should not be viewed as insuperably problematic, 
nor should explored solutions include the abrogation of the procedure. This is 
particularly so when the entire gamut of PIL jurisdiction is considered, especially 
the human rights jurisdiction.  
Commentary on the exercise of PIL jurisdiction in India, for example, 
ranges from opposition to appreciation of the role of the court in achieving social 
justice.133 Hence, the criticism outlined above notwithstanding, there is no 
shortage of extenuation commentaries on the exercise of PIL jurisdiction in India. 
For example, on the relegation of locus standi rules to allow PIL, Peiris observed 
that “[at] the core of the concern consistently shown by Indian courts for fostering 
PIL in the conditions of contemporary life in the subcontinent, is candid 
recognition that, in the absence of innovative mechanisms of this nature, 
substantive rights central to human dignity cannot but assume an illusory 
character in the eyes of large sections of the population.”134 On the question of 
direct judicial involvement in controversial policy issues, including the 
                                                 
130
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preservation of the environment, the author explored the problem, noted some 
redeeming features, and opined that “[on] the whole, then, the assessment of 
priorities by Indian courts is empirical and shows sensitivity to contextual 
factors.”135 On the question of fact-finding committees/commissions, Vijayashri 
Sripati noted that most of the petitioners in PIL cases were public-spirited 
individuals or organisations who, due to limited resources, found it onerous to 
establish or prove violations of rights by states. This was the impetus of the courts 
in forming the commissions to aid the litigants in the expensive task of fact 
finding.136    
In Bangladesh, PIL for environmental justice is principally a procedure 
engendered by the interplay of Articles102 and 32 of the Constitution. This makes 
PIL primarily a fundamental rights enforcement procedure, whereby certain 
stringent procedural hurdles are relaxed. Although barriers are somewhat more 
relaxed in PIL procedures, one is not to suppose that there are no other barriers to 
entry to the effect that frivolous actions would ensue. As seen in the FAP 20 
Case, representation of those who cannot represent themselves would seem to be 
a pre-requisite.137 Although standing has been gained for environmental civil 
society organisations, in his concurring judgment in the FAP-20 Case, Latifur 
Rahman, J., noted, “that any application filed by an individual, group of 
individuals, associations and social activists must be carefully scrutinized by the 
court itself to see as to whether the petitioner has got sufficient and genuine 
interest in the proceeding to focus a public wrong or public injury.”138 The test of 
“sufficient and genuine interest”, therefore, still subsists in Bangladesh, 
notwithstanding the granting of standing to social groups.139 Furthermore, from 
our discussion of resource mobilisation above, it is clear that not every 
organisation would be able to employ PIL as a movement strategy. In the light of 
the current enforcement climate for environmental laws and policies in 
Bangladesh, to argue against PIL in broad terms and recommend further 
procedural restriction of access to the courts would seem difficult to support. 
Nevertheless, some of the questions raised on the manner in which the courts have 
chosen to exercise their powers in PIL cases deserve further discussion as they 
relate to Bangladesh. In particular, the questions of access, participation, 
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effectiveness and sustainability pointed out by Rajamani, and Armin Rosencranz 
and Michael Jackson, are pertinent.   
 
1. Effectiveness 
 
Regarding effectiveness, Rajamani notes that “[a]lthough the Court’s 
environmental commitment is seldom challenged, its ability to devise effective 
solutions to the problems under consideration is often called into question.”140 In 
the first place, given the other issues raised in that paper (such as sustainability) 
perhaps the courts should not go as far as devising solutions rather than reaching 
decisions that point administrators in the right direction. However, if the issue is 
whether the decisions have been effective in protecting the environment, one 
would have to consider the short term direct effects and reliefs in the decisions, 
and the long term indirect effects of the decisions.  
In Bangladesh, regarding the short-term reliefs and their implementation, 
the environmental legal activists have had mixed results. In some instances, they 
were successful in not only eliciting favourable court decisions, but also in 
securing positive responses from the government in the implementation of the 
judicial decisions. A good example is the Dhaka City Vehicular Pollution Case.141  
Dhaka, the capital of Bangladesh, is one of the most polluted cities in the 
world. Many vehicles in Dhaka city used leaded petroleum and contributed to the 
emission of lead-laced gases. To save the city dwellers from air pollution, BELA 
filed a writ petition for necessary direction to control vehicular air pollution in 
Dhaka City. In that case, the Supreme Court directed the government to, inter 
alia, phase out all existing two stroke three-wheeler vehicles, which were the 
most polluting vehicles, from Dhaka City by December, 2002. Although this was 
a difficult task, the government implemented the court direction. However, the 
implementation of this decision did not occasion the type of hardship and top-
heavy court-mediated oversight discussed by Rajamani regarding the Delhi 
Vehicular pollution cases. “The government gave the three-wheeler owners many 
incentives and options and pushed them to the wall to accept these. For the most 
part, drivers were rehabilitated in some way or the other.”142 
However, this successful implementation outcome has not been replicated 
across the board. In many other cases, the decisions have not been properly 
implemented. Some of the projects that were successfully challenged by the 
activists were ultimately executed by the government. Some of these projects 
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have engendered serious environmental harm. For example, the FAP-20 project 
referred to above was ultimately improperly executed in defiance of the judgment.  
In the judgment on merit in the FAP 20 Case, A.K. Badrul Huq, J., observed 
that “in implementing the project the respondents cannot with impunity violate the 
provisions of law. We are of the view that the FAP-20 project work should be 
executed in compliance with the requirements of law.”143 Unfortunately, 
government authorities have not followed the relevant principles of the applicable 
laws. They violated the directions of the court in the judgment. The worst part of the 
execution of the project is that no compensation has been paid to the people affected 
by it. As a result, BELA filed another writ petition against different government 
authorities to assess the compensation for the “Project Affected People”. 144 In this 
writ petition, the High Court Division issued a Rule Nisi, calling upon several 
government authorities.145 However, any compensation for the said Project Affected 
People is yet to be realised. This goes to show that although the legal activists have 
been successful in achieving the recognition of the human right to a healthy 
environment, the real fruits of this jurisprudential development are not always easily 
translated into reality in the lives of the people. 
The vulnerabilities of judicial activism have been magnified with the recent 
deadlock in the relocation of the leather goods and processing industry in an effort 
to stop massive environmental pollution. The leather-processing industry is one of 
the oldest industries in Bangladesh. It is mainly located on the banks of the 
Buriganga, one of the main rivers at the heart of the capital city of this country. 
Bangladesh has more than 200 leather goods and processing companies, and at 
least 178 of these are located in 50 acres of land on the banks of the Buriganga.146 
They process hides into finished leather using acids and chromium, producing 
roughly 20 million square metres of leather and leather goods each year. They 
account for an average of 1.5 per cent of the total exports of this country over the 
last three years.147 
The most important feature of this industry is the fact that it is the main 
water polluter in this country. None of the companies within this industry has an 
effluent management plant, and most of their 30,000 workers work in chemical-
filled environments without the required protective equipment. It is notoriously 
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the most significant water polluter in Bangladesh: the leather industry alone 
pollutes 26 per cent of the total river water of Bangladesh.148 People living near 
these tanneries are “exposed to higher morbidity and mortality compared to 
people living two to three kilometres away”.149 A recent report shows that the 
leather goods and processing plants of different companies (particularly on the 
banks of the Buriganga) have dumped approximately 3,000 tons of liquid waste in 
the Buriganga. In effect, they have turned this river into a toxic dump by 
indiscriminately discharging their waste into it.150 
Given these circumstances, the government has decided to shift these 
manufacturing units to a 200-acre industrial zone near the capital city. Bangladesh 
Small and Cottage Industries Corporation (BSCIC) has developed this zone for 
these units at a cost of US$66.42 million, and has almost finalised the process for 
establishing a central effluent plant in this zone, at a cost of US$61.42 million. 
Nonetheless, this relocation is at a crossroads. In 2003, the High Court Division 
finally provided a guideline, which is mandatory for all residents of this country 
according to the constitution of Bangladesh, to facilitate the relocation. However, 
the industry owners and government authorities have failed to begin the move.151 
The court has repeatedly provided more time, but the relocation has not 
advanced.152 This regulatory deadlock syndrome can be traced back to the 
notification of August 7, 1986, when the Ministry of Local Government, Rural 
Development and Cooperatives identified 903 industrial units of 14 sectors as 
polluters. It directed the Department of Environment, the Ministry of 
Environment and Forests and the Ministry of Industries to ensure appropriate 
pollution control measures were undertaken by these industries within three years. 
The notification also obliged these authorities to ensure that no new industry 
could be established without pollution-fighting devices. However, between 1986 
and 1994, they failed to ensure that these industries undertook any suitable 
pollution control measures. 
In 1994, BELA filed a writ petition before the High Court Division of the 
Supreme Court of Bangladesh seeking relief against the indiscriminate pollution 
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of air, water, soil and the environment by 903 industrial units. These units 
included tanneries; paper, pulp, and sugar mills; distilleries; as well as the iron 
and steel, fertiliser, insecticide and pesticide, chemical, cement, pharmaceutical, 
textile, rubber and plastic, tyre and tube and jute industries.153 It was pled that, 
though the air and water of the major rivers of this country were being severely 
affected by these 903 units, the government organisations responsible had failed 
to tackle this damage to the ecological system. The petitioner, moreover, informed 
the court that the number of polluting units had risen to 1,176, according to the 
list prepared by the Department of Environment. 
In the first instance, the court issued a Rule Nisi to the respondents, 
including the Ministry of Local Government, Rural Development and 
Cooperatives, Ministry of Environment and Forest, Ministry of Industries and 
Department of Environment to show cause as to why they should not be directed 
to implement the decisions of the Government. After hearing all the parties, the 
Rule was made absolute. On July 15, 2001, the court directed the Director 
General of the Department of Environment to implement the decision to mitigate 
the pollution by the original 903 units within six months from the date of the 
judgment. The court directed to “report to this Court after six months by 
furnishing concerned affidavit showing that compliance of this Order of this 
Court.”154 To ensure the implementation of the court’s directions, it was further 
held that “it will be imperative on the part of the Director General to take penal 
action against such department for persons who are responsible for not 
implementing the letter of the Environment Conservation Act, 1995.”155 
Of these 903 industrial units, most are leather goods and processing 
companies. Of the 178 tanneries situated on the bank of Buriganga, 158 have been 
red-listed by the Department of Environment.156 None of these companies has any 
kind of effluent plant, which has virtually transformed the Buriganga into a pool 
of septic water.157 According to the environmental laws of Bangladesh, this 
situation is intolerable. BELA brought this issue before the High Court Division 
of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh and claimed directions for relocating these 
units from the bank of the Buriganga.158 The court issued a Rule Nisi on March 3, 
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2003, and called upon the seven government agencies and two tannery 
associations as respondents. The court summoned the Secretaries of the Ministries 
of Industries and Commerce and Environment and Forest; the Director General 
and the Director of the Department of Environment; a member of the Planning 
Commission; and the chairmen of RAJUK (the capital city development 
authority), BSCIC, and the Tanners Association. They were asked to show cause 
as to why they should not be directed to relocate the tanneries from the city to a 
suitable location, as contemplated in the Master Plan prepared under the Town 
Improvement Act 1953, within 18 months from the date of judgment. The court 
directed them to ensure that adequate pollution-fighting devices were developed 
in the new location or site as required under the Environment Conservation Act 
1995 and the Factories Act 1965. They were also directed to notify the court 
regarding the process of the relocation of the tanneries and submit a report in this 
regard to the court within six months. This petition is still pending before the 
court. 
While failing to treat these tanneries according to the provisions 
mentioned in the Act and other related laws, the government is trying to relocate 
them to a well-planned leather industry zone near the city; an industrial zone has 
been developed with adequate industrial plots for them. Many of them have 
obtained their plots in the new industrial zone where the construction of an 
effluent plant is underway. Nonetheless, the tanneries are not interested in moving 
from the banks of the Buriganga. They maintain that they will not consider 
relocating until the government (a) pays them $155.57 million as compensation, 
(b) discharges them from the debt they owe to the commercial banks, (c) provides 
them loans at a low interest rate, and (d) ensures that the government will bear the 
cost of maintaining the effluent plant. In 2006, a committee, formed by the 
secretaries of the government ministries concerned, suggested the government pay 
$33.60 million to the tanneries as compensation.159 Both parties are standing their 
ground with respect to their remaining demands.  
The PIL filed by BELA is still pending before the court. According to 
Article 112 of the Constitution of Bangladesh, all executive and judicial agencies 
are obliged to carry out the directions of the High Court Division of the Supreme 
Court of Bangladesh. Unfortunately, these respondents have not been able to 
carry out the court’s directions; they have sought more time from the court, and 
the court has allowed them time for the ends of justice. Meanwhile, the Buriganga 
has been becoming increasingly toxic, and the government is losing its investment 
in preparing a modern leather industrial zone. At this time, the respondents have 
extended their time to carry out the court’s directions, and nobody knows when 
they will reach a concrete solution. 
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Long-term indirect effects of court decisions are more difficult to measure. 
However, the recognition, publicity, and impetus that these decisions have given to 
the legal activists as intimated above are all part of the indirect effect; they amount 
to political capital that could supplement other movement strategies outside the 
courts. Beyond these, there are other signs of long-term effectiveness of decided 
cases, even in cases with adverse short-term outcomes. For example, in BELA v. 
Bangladesh (Modhumoti Model Town Case),160 the petitioner challenged the 
legality of a land development project that interfered with natural drainage by 
making changes to the flood flow/sub-flood flow zones near Dhaka City contrary 
to the Dhaka Metropolitan Master Plan. However, the court ruled that although 
the project is illegal, the interest of the third party purchasers of plots of land in 
Modhumoti Model Town should be protected as they are bona fide purchasers for 
value without notice.161 In the short run, this was not the complete positive 
outcome that BELA hoped for. However, in 2008, the government announced that 
it was going to amend rules to stop unplanned urbanisation across the country. 
The first rule for private housing projects that resulted from the Modhumoti Model 
Town Case only applied to the Rajdhani Unnayan Kartripakkha (Rajuk) areas.162 
 
2. Sustainability   
 
According to Rajamani, in India, the phenomenon of endless judicial oversight in 
public interest cases is not sustainable for several reasons. It takes up the time of 
the court and hampers the functioning of the judicial system. The courts are able 
to cope with the time constraints in part by appointing committees whose ad hoc 
nature may lead to inconsistencies and possible inequities. Furthermore, such 
lengthy court oversight leads to reactive instead of proactive administration. It 
also creates an unhealthy and tension-ridden relationship of dependence and 
places tremendous strain on government resources.163 As noted above, in the 
context of the Delhi Pollution Case, Rosencranz and Jackson pointed out the 
likelihood of the strong stance of the Supreme Court leading to impediment of 
capacity building in the pollution control agencies and compromise of the 
development of sustained environmental management in India.164 
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The foregoing concerns are increasingly applicable to Bangladesh, where 
the Supreme Court has a tendency to follow its Indian counterpart in 
environmental cases. Lawyers in Bangladesh frequently refer to Indian 
judgments, and the judges also cite Indian cases in their judgments, as is evident 
in some of the cases discussed in this paper. Recently, like the Indian Supreme 
Court, Bangladeshi courts have started maintaining lengthy oversight of the 
implementation of their decisions. For example, in BELA v. Bangladesh (MT 
Enterprise Case), the Supreme Court issued the following order:  
 
The Government is directed to set up a High Level Technical Committee 
comprising representatives from Ministry/Department of Shipping, the 
Ministry/Department of Environment, Ministry of Labour and Manpower; 
Retired Naval officers; Academicians/Experts in the field of Marine 
Engineering and Marine Biology; Specialist in the field of Environment, 
Science and Ecology, [and] Hazardous Waste Management; and relevant 
NGOs, such as BELA.165 
 
Similarly, in Rabia Bhuiyan, MP v. Ministry of LGRD and others, the 
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court maintained lengthy oversight of its 
decision requiring, inter alia, a yearly report on steps taken to implement the 
relevant policy.166 In adopting this measure, the court relied on two decisions of 
the Supreme Court of India. These were MC Mehta v. Union of India167 (the Delhi 
Pollution Case), where the court required the submission of regular reports by a 
committee it set up, and the ruling of the High Court Division in the Dhaka City 
Vehicular Pollution Case,168 where the court deemed the case pending for the 
purpose of monitoring and required six-monthly reports.  
In short, few will doubt that litigation does not yield long-term social 
change. Notwithstanding, some social movement theories indicate that there is a 
danger of the continued employment of litigation even after it has outlived its 
usefulness as a strategy or when other strategies would be more effective. The 
transformation of social movement organisation may take place in several ways, 
including by “organisational maintenance”. In this phenomenon, “the primary 
activity of the organization becomes the maintenance of membership, funds, and 
other requirements of organizational existence.”169 The danger of this sort of 
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transformation is all too real when an organisation such as BELA becomes 
defined by success in high profile cases with the attendant recognition and 
publicity. In such cases, the temptation to maintain the status quo is high. The 
word of caution here is that organisational maintenance should not be allowed to 
supplant the original environmental pursuits. 
 
3. Access and Participation 
 
Rajamani also argued that there is a tremendous scope for value preferences in 
PILs because of the characteristic procedural flexibility, collaborative approach, 
judicially supervised interim orders, and the forward-looking reliefs. The courts 
are thus perceived as middle class intellectuals that are more receptive to others of 
their ilk. This perception, argues Rajamani, is in itself deeply restrictive for 
participation. Furthermore, litigation cost factors contrive to alienate the poor 
from the portals of the courts, such that PILs are filed on behalf of the poor and 
not by them.170 
Room for biases and value preferences characteristic of whatever echelon 
of the society the judges belong to would seem to be inevitable, with the 
procedural flexibility that continues to be a feature of PILs in India. There are also 
signs that Bangladeshi courts are not immune to this charge. In reading some of 
the judgements cited in this paper, one could not but notice some instances in 
which the judges seem not to be particularly fettered by extant limitations of the 
law. For example, in the decision of the Appellate Division to maintain 
administrative oversight of its ruling in Rabia Bhuiyan, MP v. Ministry of LGRD 
and others, there was no analysis by the court to provide some basis in law for 
such a novel role for the courts. The court chose instead to place reliance on the 
fact that the Indian Supreme Court had done the same thing.  
In the same vein, the courts are likely to be flexible in other aspects of 
their exercise of PIL jurisdiction, such that the scope for discretion is enlarged. 
The degree to which the blame for this shortcoming should be apportioned 
between the judges, who reach the decisions, and the legal activists, who frame 
the claims, is difficult to determine without further research. However, both can 
play a role in attenuating this feature of PIL in Bangladesh. The judges can self-
restrain, while the activists should, in framing their claims, bear in mind that there 
is much to be gained from the continued objectivity of the judiciary.  
Perhaps the activists in Bangladesh have an opportunity to play a role here 
because there are fewer organisations engaged in PIL and some of the 
organisations have initiated educational programs that include environmental 
training for judges. Having said this, in seeking to reform this area of law, regard 
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must also be paid to some of the plausible raison d'être of the flexibility that 
attaches to PIL, as adumbrated in some of the extenuation commentaries above. 
Care must also be taken to not overemphasise this limitation, because different 
forms of biases and value preferences are equally true of the judiciary in most 
countries on various issues, whether or not the environment is in issue, and 
whether or not the courts countenance PILs. 
Furthermore, for Bangladesh, anybody familiar with the state of the poor 
would agree that there are real obstacles to the poor representing themselves. The 
poor have neither the financial resources nor the technical knowhow for self-
representation. Indeed, understanding the issues at stake in some environmental 
matters would usually be an uphill task for the general populace. One can only 
imagine the difficulty that would be involved in explaining the health issues in the 
Radiated Milk Case to the underprivileged. Most of the poor would ordinarily 
view the tainted product as affordable milk. The same is true regarding the ship 
breaking and shrimp cultivation cases; many would understandably see the 
impugned activities as sources of income and nothing more because the dangers 
and adverse effects are not immediately apparent. These limitations leave 
representative litigation as one of the few viable options. Having said this, it is 
equally true that it is a failure of Bangladeshi environmental legal activism that 
poor people seem to have a minimal role in the decision-making process.  
A recent incident buttresses this point. On February 22, 2010, newspaper 
reports indicated that workers of shipbreaking yards “staged a protest against a 
new national import policy that requires all vessels destined for recycling in 
Chittagong to carry a pre-cleaning certificate.”171 This policy is a direct result of 
the MT Enterprise Case referred to above.172 However, there is an allegation that 
this kind of protests is fake and mostly carried out by people hired by the 
shipbreaking industry owners.173 
Notwithstanding, whereas this protest demonstrates that segments of the 
society were unhappy with the decision, it would be naive to conclude that this is 
the sole or predominant view on the matter, because there are other views. In a 
video clip on a webpage in the website of the Goldman Prize, the Chief Executive 
of BELA contends that ship breaking is a trade of hazardous waste in disguise, 
since the ships are not pre-cleaned before being sent to Bangladesh and as such 
release toxic wastes into the coastal area. She informed that they received reports 
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of deaths in the shipbreaking yards at least once a month.174 She also notes, “[this] 
is polluting the coastal environment, affecting the fishermen, killing so many 
labourers so on that ground we move against this very hazardous operation of the 
industry.”175 The clip also featured a young woman who had lost her husband in a 
ship-breaking yard accident, and another man who claims to have been disabled 
due to an accident sustained in one of the yards. BELA selects the cases it files 
from hundreds that are reported to it with requests for redress.176  
Hence, although the underprivileged would in some instances be adversely 
affected by some of the decisions, it is still a segment of that same constituency 
that seems to animate BELA’s litigation activities, and the same may be said for 
at least some of the cases filed by the other legal activist organisations.  
Using the shipbreaking cases as an example, the question then is how to 
balance the right to life of the workers and the health of the people in the coastal 
area against the right of all the workers in the ship breaking and ancillary 
industries to a means of livelihood. Perhaps a balance could be struck if litigation 
is used sparingly as a last resort, and even then with extensive consultation with 
the stakeholders and assessment of the impact of the anticipated reliefs on the less 
privileged. Imaginative reliefs could then be sought with emphasis on how to 
reduce the negative impact of possible rulings on those dependent on the 
impugned industry or activity. Perhaps the courts could also encourage out-of-
court settlements with a view to encouraging the leaders in each industry to 
contribute to phased implementation and the rehabilitation of those who would be 
affected. The possibility of an adverse ruling should encourage all to negotiate a 
settlement outside the courts.  
The main justification of PIL in Bangladesh is, for the most part, that the 
poor and underprivileged are unable to represent themselves. With appropriate 
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environmental enlightenment, even where the poor are unable to access the 
courts, other forms of action, such as protest, would be viable.177 
In sum, PILs do have limitations. Environmental PILs have had mixed 
results in Bangladesh in practical terms. The picture of a handful of activists 
continuing indefinitely to represent the poor and defend the environmental causes 
is not a pretty one.178 The attendant lengthy judicial oversight of PIL-engendered 
decisions is certainly unsustainable. Perhaps these facts are not lost on the 
activists. The chief executive of BELA, for example, is reported to have reflected 
that “some of the most significant achievements in environmental law and policy 
reform have resulted from the patient dialogue and relationship building that she 
and her colleagues at BELA have advocated.”179  
Given credit to the civil society groups and the courts for developing an 
awareness and legal activism in environmental regulation in Bangladesh, a core 
question is whether the judiciary could be an engine of social change. Rosenberg 
doubts the feasibility of such a role. He has developed court types – a dynamic 
court model and a constrained court model – and tests the impact of these courts 
by examining social policies and practices before and after a number of apex 
courts’ decisions often regarded as important sources of social change. He finds 
that the courts decisions have had no or virtually no significant independent direct 
or indirect effect on social change. He argued that special change depends on 
other factors like political efforts wholly separate from the court system.180 
Rajamani also assessed the impact of the leading PILs on the social changes in 
India. He finds that the legal activism has been able to provide some 
“chemotherapy for the carcinogenic body politic”181 and exemplary work. 
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However, he raises concerns over the exercise of public interest environmental 
jurisdiction with respect to access, participation, effectiveness, and 
sustainability.182  
The discussion above also shows that legal activism in Bangladesh often 
developed “policy evolution fora” for a particular national issue and gets into the 
executive governance with judicial governance in sectors highlighted by a group 
of public interest litigants.183 Along with an insufficient impact on a substantive 
change into the social movement, this type of overlapping in the major organs of 
the State reveal some dissatisfaction with the judicial process. The social change 
motion set by the judicial activism in this country, in most cases, is less than 
participatory; therefore, arguably, this has led to unrealistic solutions. Some 
stakeholders have already raised their voices against this activism, claiming that 
the solutions provided from the court system are, in most cases, ineffective and 
unsustainable. 
In PIL, the court can focus more on the development of some principles to 
solve a particular issue, and it should not get heavily involved in regulating the 
organisations of the government. It should, rather, boost the notion of “new 
governance”, where the governance is less reliant on state-dictated preferences 
and more on public-private collaboration, flexibility, and pragmatism.184 Legal 
activism can push the political system to take the agents related to social change 
onto the board. To put this pressure on the political system and to bring other 
agents of social change into the governance system, courts can use PIL as a 
forum.  
 
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The aim of PIL is to provide the opportunity for any member of the society to use 
the judicial activism to obtain redress for any activities detrimental to public 
welfare. It is a means by which the apex court can deal with public rights and 
liabilities within the constitutional framework and can direct the government 
agencies to address any issue ruled to be against the public interest. In a society 
where poverty and corruption are prevalent and corporate society has a strong 
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influence on political society, PIL could be an effective way through which the 
judicial activism can insist that public and private organisations are more 
accountable, especially against the backdrop of the legislatures’ apathy and the 
lack of political will in the executive branches.185 However, its potential to create 
a strong peoples’ movement to reach their goal using PIL is not sufficient. 
Nevertheless, using PIL as a means, the outlook of legal activism creating a much 
more constructive role of society in general and informed groups in particular is 
rosy.  
It is likely that the organisations currently engaged in litigation would 
continue to file cases. However, the danger is that this is likely to continue even 
when short term remedial reliefs would be the only benefit as returns on long term 
movement-building benefits begin to diminish. The legal activists may find 
themselves increasingly engaged in organisational maintenance. Litigation, being 
reactive, would then be incapable of contributing to the desirable goal of 
sustainable environmental justice. Since litigation is already yielding movement-
building benefits, this paper recommends that these be relied upon incrementally 
in the deployment of more sustainable strategies, such as education, lobbying, and 
other forms of participation in policy development. This calls for greater focus on 
strategies other than those presently adopted. However, this may necessitate the 
formation of new organisations with greater expertise in the new forms of 
political strategy. To be successful, the new entrants would have to form strong 
partnerships with the legal activists that have already gained reputation, prestige, 
and other forms of political capital. Therefore, the long-term success of the 
environmental social movement in Bangladesh may depend on the readiness of 
the established organisations to encourage and support new organisations with 
new strategies. The focus of this paper on the activities of social movement 
organisations should however not belie the fact that the implementation of 
environmental laws and policies remains, primarily, the responsibility of States. 
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